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Abstract 
The strategy of product differentiation has been viewed as very important in the field of business 
administration, but it has not necessarily been viewed as an important source of large differences 
in firms’ profits in the field of economics. In this paper, this apparent contradiction is examined 
based on the concepts of “ranking preference and value.” In the proposed model, if a product’s 
implicit rank is higher, households will purchase the product far more often than competing 
products even if their qualities are almost identical and the tastes of households are uniformly 
distributed. Even a slight difference in quality can result in a clear difference in implicit ranks and 
consequently large differences in firms’ profits. Therefore, the effects of differentiation are 
amplified by ranking preference, and product differentiation efforts are truly very important for 
firms. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The importance of product differentiation has been emphasized in the field of business 
administration, particularly by Porter (1980, 1985), who included differentiation as one of the 
three fundamental generic strategies of cost leadership, differentiation, and focus. Many 
researchers have also since studied differentiation from this perspective (e.g., Miller, 1988; De 
Meyer et al., 1989; Kotha and Orne, 1989; Kotha and Vadlamani, 1995; Lillis, 2002; Baines and 
Langfield-Smith, 2003). However, most of the arguments on differentiation in business 
administration are descriptive, and the mechanism behind differentiation does not seem to be 
sufficiently clear. 
Product differentiation has been also studied in economics. The most important early 
example is the work of Hotelling (1929), which was extended by, among others, Salop (1979), 
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980), and Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983). Hotelling explained 
product differentiation based on a location model in which a linear city of length 1 is assumed 
and a duopoly game is played by two shops located along the linear city. Consumers are assumed 
to be distributed uniformly along the linear city and prices are constant and equal between the 
two shops. The basic result is that the two shops’ profits are identical at a Nash equilibrium 
because the best strategy is for the shops to be located next to each other. This is known as 
Hotelling’s law or the principle of minimum differentiation, and it means that it is rational for 
firms to make their products as similar to a rival firm’s product as possible. Because competing 
firms use similar strategies and positions, their profits are similar even if households’ tastes are 
different.  
 The arguments of Hotelling (1929) and those of Porter (1980, 1985) seem to contradict 
each other. In markets, rival firms are fiercely competitive, and therefore their products usually 
seem very similar, as Hotelling (1929) indicated they should be. On the other hand, Porter (1980, 
1985) argued that the differentiation strategy is so important that firms should pursue it as much 
as possible. The model in Hotelling (1929) implies that a slight amount of product differentiation 
will slightly alter a firm’s profits, but such a small difference will only have small effects on a 
firm’s prosperity. The question arises then: If product differentiation results in only slight 
differences in profits, why is a differentiation strategy so important for firms?  
 In this paper, I examine this contradiction and show that both arguments are correct in 
their essences, but both equally lack an important element. The missing element is what 
Harashima (2016) called “ranking preference and value.” People feel, obtain, or consume “value” 
when using, enjoying, or consuming goods and services. Values derived from practical use have 
normally been considered in economics, but people will also consume value derived from ranking. 
For example, if a curio is evaluated to be the best among a set of similar items, its price will 
increase until it is much higher than that of other similar items even if it is not practically useful. 
That is, people obtain utility not only from practical use but also from a sense of ranking. This 
means that people have a “ranking preference” and consume “ranking values” (see the Appendix 
for a detailed discussion).  
 If we consider people’s ranking preferences, we can uncover the reason why product 
differentiation is so important. Even if the qualities of competing products are almost identical 
and tastes are distributed uniformly across households, the products’ ranks will clearly 
differentiate them and result in large differences in firms’ profits. Therefore, firms’ product 
differentiation efforts are truly very important.  
 
2  RANKING PREFERENCE AND VALUE 
 
In this section, the concepts of ranking preference and value that were first presented by 
Harashima (2016) are briefly summarized. These concepts are explained in detail in the Appendix. 
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2.1  Ranking value 
Value is regarded as reflecting something useful. There are two kinds of value: practical value 
and ranking value. Practical value is the value that people perceive when consuming a good or 
service for practical purposes. Ranking value is the value that people feel from the rank of a good 
or service in a set of similar types of goods or services that people use, possess, or observe. 
Ranking value, therefore, is the value people place on goods or services on the basis of their 
relative place within a set of similar goods or services (e.g., the ranking of a book in a best-seller 
list or that of a professional sport team in a league).  
 
2.2  Ranking preference 
Goods and services have the following properties: quantity, quality, and rank. Quality is related 
to practical value, rank is related to ranking value, and quantity is related to both values. Suppose 
that the quality and rank of each good or service are given exogenously and fixed. Here, for 
simplicity, I assume that there is only one type of good or service in the economy, and that all 
goods or services belong to this type (these goods or services are hereafter called “goods”) and 
are substitutable for each other for households’ practical uses. Although the goods are 
substitutable from the point of view of practical use, they are differentiated from the point of view 
of rank. 
 Let R (= 1, 2, 3, …) be the rank of the goods. Goods with rank R = 1 are those most 
preferred by households, R = 2 indicates the next most preferred, and so on. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that no goods have the same rank. A household’s utility derived from consuming the 
goods with rank R is  
 
 Rqqu RlRn ,, ,,  
 
where qn,R and ql,R are the quantity and quality of the goods with rank R, respectively. For 
simplicity, the utility of the household is modified to  
 
 Rqu R ,
~  
 
where
Rq
~ is the “quality-adjusted quantity” of the goods with rank R, and
l,Rn,RR qqq 
~ .  
 The utility function has the following conventional characteristics: 
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In addition, for any Rr ,  
 
   ,rqu,rqu rr
~1~   
 
and 
 
         ,rqu,rqu,rqu,rqu rrrr
~1~1~2~   . 
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2.3  Monopoly power 
The presence of ranking preference and value gives monopoly powers to the producers of high 
rank products because selling ranking values to consumers requires no additional cost; that is, the 
marginal cost of producing a ranking value is zero. Therefore, these producers can set the prices 
of their products above their marginal costs (see the Appendix).  
 
2.4  Implicit ranking 
Although some goods and services have explicit rankings (e.g., a book on a best-seller list), most 
goods and services do not because there is no open or formal competition among them. However, 
it is highly likely that people still feel a sense of ranking, possibly unconsciously, from many 
goods and services because they usually want to know which products most people are paying 
attention to, and to buy the products that are the most popular and well known. Fame is valuable 
because it provides information about “implicit rankings” and generates a sense of ranking. If 
there are no explicit product rankings, households will want to discover their implicit ranking by 
any means and will be alert to every chance of obtaining that information, for example, through 
word-of-mouth communication, social networking sites and other websites, blogs, or TV 
programs. Because implicit rankings are formed essentially on the basis of information about 
which product is more preferred and sold, they do not represent an individual household’s unique 
and personal rankings; rather, they are socially and widely recognized rankings. That is, implicit 
rankings basically represent households’ common knowledge.   
 
2.5  Positional goods 
The concept of ranking preference and value may be seen as the same as that of positional goods 
(Frank, 1985, 1991; Solnick and Hemenway, 1998). The essential nature of positional goods is 
that people demand positional goods for the purpose of seeking status—that is, because they can 
feel, and be seen as, special—in particular, as superior to other people. Hence, positional goods 
are mostly luxury goods and services. On the other hand, non-luxury goods and services as well 
as luxury goods and services can have ranking values. In essence, the theory of positional goods 
reflects the rankings of consumers, whereas that of ranking preference and value reflects the 
rankings of goods and services. The emotions or desires of people in these contexts are therefore 
completely different.  
 Although the concept of positional goods is useful when studying luxury goods and 
services, this paper focuses on non-luxury goods and services. The markets for luxury goods and 
services (i.e., positional goods) are beyond the scope of this paper; therefore, those goods are 
ignored here. 
  
 
3  THE MECHANISM BEHIND PRODUCT 
DIFFERENTIATION 
 
3.1  The model 
3.1.1  A household’s choice  
Suppose that there are two products (Product 1 and Product 2) that are purchased for an identical 
practical use, and each of them is produced by one of two competing firms (Firm 1 and Firm 2 
produce Product 1 and Product 2, respectively). A household purchases one of the two products. 
Before purchasing it, a household compares them and judges which product is better, or the 
“winner.” Even if the two products’ prices are equal and their qualities are almost identical, a 
household must judge one of the two products as the winner because it purchases only one of 
them.   
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 There are many aspects that distinguish the two products, including quality, packaging, 
design, label, trademark, and price. To assess the products comprehensively, a household awards 
weighted “points” to a product for each of those various aspects, sums the points, compares the 
total weighted sums for Products 1 and 2, judges the product with the greater number of points as 
the winner, and purchases the winner. 
 Households also have a ranking preference with regard to the two products; therefore, 
in addition to points awarded for the previously mentioned aspects, points are also given on the 
basis of the product’s implicit ranking. For simplicity, it is assumed that no goods have the same 
rank, except for a zero rank (or as yet unranked) as discussed below.     
 
3.1.2  The total sum of points 
Suppose that a household assigns points to products, particularly with regard to quality, taste (i.e., 
a preference for color, design, or any of a variety of a product’s aspects), and rank. Points for quality 
and taste are given by real numbers, but those for rank are given by natural numbers because, 
unlike quality and taste, ranks are intrinsically discrete. “Quality” indicates the degree of 
usefulness for a practical purpose(s). If the quality of a product is thought to be higher, more 
points are assigned to the product. In this context, usefulness includes many aspects, such as ease 
of use, durability, safety, reliability, and functionality. Therefore, quality points are awarded in 
consideration of many sub-categories of quality. Let qi (i = 1, 2, …, Q) be points given by a 
household to a product with regard to i aspects of quality, where there are a total of Q aspects. 
“Taste” indicates the degree to which a household likes or dislikes a product for a given set of 
quality, rank, and price. If a product is more fitted to a household’s taste, more points are awarded. 
Taste also consists of various aspects (e.g., color, design, smell, palate, tactile properties, etc.). 
Let tj (j = 1, 2, …, T) be points given by a household to a product with regard to j aspects of taste, 
where there are a total of T aspects. Suppose for simplicity that points given by households to any 
aspect of taste are uniformly distributed in a finite interval, following the model of Hotelling 
(1929); that is, there is no particular aspect of taste that is unevenly preferred by households. 
“Rank” indicates the implicit rank of a product. Let RP be points given by a household to a product 
with regard to rank, where RP = 1 indicates the highest rank and RP = 2 is the second. Unlike qi 
and ti, RP for each product is common across households because RP is a socially recognized rank. 
If an implicit ranking has not yet been formed socially, then RP = 0 for any product and household. 
Finally, let Π be the price of a unit of a product and be commonly known to all households. 
 The total number of points given by a household to a product is 
 
Π
Rwtwqw
T
PR
T
j
jt
Q
i
iq 


 11~  ,                     (1) 
 
where wq, wt, and wR are constant weights. Because higher ranks have smaller point values (i.e., 
RP = 1 is the highest or best rank), wR < 0. A household purchases the product that has the larger
T
~
. The weights wq, wt, and wR will differ across households but, for simplicity, they are assumed 
to be identical for all households. Suppose also for simplicity that Π is identical for the two 
products and equals 1.  
 Note that wR depends on the strength of households’ ranking preference. For given 
values of wq and wt, a larger absolute value of wR indicates a stronger ranking preference. Note 
also that, in actuality, wR is not independent of RP but may be, for example, an exponentially 
decreasing function of RP with some lower limit. However, because there are only two competing 
products in the model, wR is assumed to be constant and independent of RP. 
 
3.1.3  The probability of purchase 
For simplicity, the total points given by households to Product v (v = 1, 2) are assumed to be 
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uniformly distributed between the interval from 1vT to 1vT for any v where Tv is the mean of 
the total points given by households to Product v (see Figure 1). That is, the probability density 
function of total points for Product v is  
 
 
2
1
xf  
 
for 11  vv TxT , and 
 
    1
1
1



dxxf
v
v
T
T
 . 
 
In addition,
21 TT  , and T1 and T2 are not correlated with each other.  
 
Figure 1: Distributions of 1
~
T  and 2
~
T  across households 
   
 Let
vT
~
be the total points given by a household to Product v. Given the distribution of 
total points given by households (Figure 1), the probability that a household awards more total 
points to Product 1 (
1
~
T ) than to Product 2 ( 2
~
T ) is 
 
    dxxTdxTTp T
T
T
T 2
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
1~~
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1
1
1
1
21
2
1
1
2
 




 
    44
8
1
21
2
21  TTTT   ,                       (2) 
 
where   1~~ 21 TTp if 221 TT (i.e., all households purchase Product 1). Equation (2) indicates 
Distribution 
of  
x 
Distribution 
of  
T2 - 1 T
1
 - 1 T
2
  T
1
  T
2
 + 1 T
1
 + 1 
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that, if 
21 TT  , then  
2
1~~
21 TTp  (i.e., both products are evenly purchased by households), 
and if
21 TT  , then  
2
1~~
21 TTp  (i.e., Product 1 is purchased more than Product 2). As the 
difference between T1 and T2 increases,  21
~~
TTp  increases. 
 
3.1.4  Sequence of events 
Assume the two products are released in the market at the same time. At the time of the release, 
households do not know any information about the implicit ranks of the two products. Therefore, 
a household initially calculates
1
~
T and 2
~
T with RP = 0; that is, it calculates
Π
twqw
T
T
j
jt
Q
i
iq
v




11~ . 
Because 1Π is assumed for both products, a household initially calculates vT
~
 



T
j
jt
Q
i
iq twqw
11
and purchases the product with the higherT
~
.   
 After many households purchase the products, an implicit ranking of the products 
becomes socially established on the basis of information about which product is more preferred 
and purchased. That is, an implicit ranking is basically formed on the basis of the difference of



T
j
jt
Q
i
iqv twqwT
11
~
between the two products. After the implicit ranking becomes 
established socially, the term related to the rank (i.e., RP =1 or 2) is added in each household’s 
calculation of
vT
~
. Hence, a household calculates
PR
T
j
jt
Q
i
iqv RwtwqwT  
 11
~
and purchases 
the product with the higherT
~
.  
 
3.1.5  Ranking preference and ranking bias 
The phenomenon in which a higher-ranked product is favored may indicate the existence of 
“ranking bias” rather than ranking preference. Ranking bias means that a household’s evaluation 
of the quality of product is biased because of its implicit ranking, such that the quality of the 
product with the higher rank is perceived to be much higher than it actually is. That is, a 
household’s judgement about quality is confused and biased by its implicit ranking. 
 It may be difficult to distinguish between ranking preference and ranking bias. 
Nevertheless, rational households are not likely to be repeatedly and continuously confused and 
biased largely by information about implicit rankings. Hence, for products that are repeatedly 
purchased by a household, the effect of ranking bias will be very small and possibly even 
negligible.  
 
3.2  The decisive role of rank in households’ choices 
3.2.1  The difference between rank and the other elements 
Because ranks are intrinsically discrete, they have a very different nature from quality and taste. 
There is a lower limit of the difference between ranks (i.e., 1), and thereby there is also a lower 
limit of the difference between wRRP for adjacent ranks (i.e., wR). On the other hand, there is no 
lower limit of difference between adjacent points for quality or taste because they are represented 
by real numbers, and there is no lower limit of difference between adjacent values of 

Q
i
iq qw
1
or


T
j
jt tw
1
. Therefore, the means of all households’ 


T
j
jt
Q
i
iq twqw
11
in vT
~
can be almost 
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identical for the two products, but the means of all households’
PRRw in vT
~
are always clearly 
different unless RP = 0. Note that PRRw is common for all households because the implicit ranking 
is common to them and no tied ranks are assumed.   
 Because points assigned on the basis of any aspect of taste are assumed to be uniformly 
distributed across a finite interval (Hotelling, 1929), the means of all households’ 

T
j
jt tw
1
in
vT
~
are identical for the two products. In addition, because the firms are competing, the levels of 
technology will not differ markedly, and many of the necessary patents can be purchased. As a 
result, the qualities of competing firms’ products will become almost identical, and the means of 
all households’ 

Q
i
iq qw
1
in
vT
~
will also be almost identical in many cases. Of course, they will 
never be completely identical, but the difference in quality between competing products will be 
usually very small. Therefore, the means of all households’ 


T
j
jt
Q
i
iq twqw
11
in
vT
~
will usually 
be almost identical for two products, but the means of all households’
PRRw in vT
~
will clearly be 
different. 
 
3.2.2  Rank as the deciding factor 
If T1 and T2 are identical, the shares of sales of each product will be 50% by equation (2). Because 
the means of all households’ 


T
j
jt
Q
i
iq twqw
11
in
vT
~
are usually almost identical, as shown in 
Section 3.2.1, if RP = 0, the share of sales will also usually be almost 50%. In actuality, the shares 
of sales of many competing products are clearly different. This means that RP is not zero for many 
products; that is, an implicit ranking exists for many products, and competing products can be 
always clearly differentiated by households even though the means of all households’



T
j
jt
Q
i
iq twqw
11
in
vT
~
are usually almost identical.  
 Let
1,2, PPP RRR  where RP,1 and RP,2 are the RP of Products 1 and 2, respectively, and
2,1, PP RR  ( 2,1, PP RR  only if 02,1,  PP RR ) and thereby 0PR . (i.e., the rank of Product 1 
is higher than that of Product 2 unless 02,1,  PP RR ). In this model, 11, PR , 22, PR , and
1PR once an implicit ranking has been formed. Let also 


T
j
jtvv twTT
1
ˆ for v = 1, 2 where 
vTˆ is the total points given by an individual household without the points awarded for taste. 
Therefore,  21 TT PRRwTT  21
ˆˆ  
RwTT  21
ˆˆ . By equation (2),   
 
       



  4ˆˆ4ˆˆ
8
1
1
~~
21
2
2121 RRP wTTwTTRTTp  .          (3) 
 
Because 0ˆˆ 21 TT will hold usually, as argued in Section 3.2.1, then by equation (3), usually 
 
   
8
44
1
~~
2
21

 RRP
ww
RTTp  .                     (4) 
 
Because wR < 0 as shown in Section 3.1.2, usually 
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   
2
1
8
44
1
~~
2
21 

 RRP
ww
RTTp  . 
 
Equation (4) indicates that the magnitude of product differentiation is usually determined by the 
value of wR; that is, product differentiation is usually governed by the strength of households’ 
ranking preference. Equation (4) also indicates that the probability that Product 1 is purchased 
varies largely depending on the value of wR. As the absolute value of wR increases (i.e., as the 
strength of households’ ranking preference becomes stronger), the effect of wR on product 
differentiation increases. If the strength of the ranking preference is sufficiently strong (i.e., the 
absolute value of wR is sufficiently large), all households purchase Product 1 even if 0ˆˆ 21 TT .  
 As argued above, usually 0ˆˆ 21 TT , but T1 and T2 are sufficiently different because of 
ranks. This result indicates that a very small difference between
1Tˆ and 2Tˆ is significantly amplified 
by households’ ranking preference to a large difference between
1
~
T and 2
~
T .  
 
3.3  Monopoly profits 
As shown in Section 2.3., ranking preference and value bring monopoly power to producers of 
highly ranked products. In this example, Firm 1 therefore has monopoly power. In the previous 
sections, it is assumed that Π = 1 for both products. However, Firm 1 can set the price of Product 
1 higher than that of Product 2 because of its monopoly power. As discussed in Section 3.2.1, 
usually 0ˆˆ 21 TT , and the marginal costs of producing Products 1 and 2 will therefore be almost 
identical. Hence, Firm 1 can set the price of Product 1 higher than both its marginal cost and the 
price of Product 2; that is, Firm 1 can exploit monopoly profits. The stronger the ranking 
preference of households (i.e., the larger wR), the higher the price that Firm 1 can set for Product 
1 and the larger its monopoly profits.  
 The amount by which Firm 1 will raise the price of Product 1 will be determined 
strategically, as standard duopoly models show. As the price of Product 1 increases, its sales will 
decrease because
1
~
T decreases by equation (1).  21
~~
TTp   also decreases, but Firm 1’s profits 
increase unless it raises the price by too much. Firm 1 will consider the response of Firm 2 to its 
price strategy and set the price of Product 1 to maximize its expected profits.  
 An important reason why product differentiation is so important for firms is that even if 
the difference between
1Tˆ and 2Tˆ is very small, Firm 1 can still obtain a large amount of monopoly 
profits.  
 
3.4  Persistence of monopoly power   
Once the implicit ranking is formed, the monopoly power of Firm 1 will persist because it is not 
easy for Firm 2 to reverse the position
21 TT  even though it may be relatively easy for Firm 2 to 
reverse the position
21
ˆˆ TT  . The established implicit ranking is difficult to change because the 
implicit ranking is greatly influenced by information about which product is the better seller. 
Because more of Product 1 is currently purchased than Product 2, the additional efforts of Firm 2 
must be sufficient to override the effect of rank (i.e., wR in Tv). As a result, implicit rankings are 
persistent and so is the monopoly power of Firm 1; this is another factor supporting the importance 
of product differentiation. This persistent nature may be a source of the value of a “brand” in 
business. 
 It is not necessarily completely impossible to reverse the situation however. As will be 
shown in Section 4, using a “category differentiation strategy” and advertising can be effective in 
some cases. Furthermore, Firm 1 may relax its guard or respond slowly to Firm 2’s strategies, or 
Firm 2 may create a breakthrough innovation.  
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4  DIFFERENTIATING A PRODUCT 
 
4.1  Win by at least a narrow margin 
As argued in Section 3, an implicit ranking is initially formed essentially on the basis of a 
comparison between
1Tˆ and 2Tˆ . Therefore, it is important for a firm to first differentiate its product 
to achieve the position
21
ˆˆ TT  even though 0ˆˆ 21 TT . The initial relative advantage is extremely 
important, so it is not necessary for a firm to make
1Tˆ far larger than 2Tˆ ; it has only to make sure 
that
1Tˆ is at least slightly larger than 2Tˆ . 
 Note, however, that 
vTˆ is composed of many aspects and weights, as shown by the term



T
j
jt
Q
i
iq twqw
11
, so the allocation of the efforts is also important.  
 
4.2  Differentiation of category 
In the previous sections, it is assumed that competing products are purchased only for an identical 
practical use. Many products, however, can also be used for some secondary practical purposes. 
Even if the main practical uses of competing products are identical, their secondary practical uses 
may differ somewhat. Firms can use these possible differences in secondary practical uses to 
differentiate the product categories.  
 People feel ranking values only when the competing products belong to the same 
category. If the products are perceived to belong to different categories, people lose interest in the 
competition and feel little ranking value from these particular products. Firm 2 can utilize this 
nature of ranking preference to escape from its disadvantageous situation. If Firm 2 can add some 
secondary practical uses to Product 2 that are different from the secondary practical uses of 
Product 1 by using a “category differentiation strategy,” households may begin to think that 
Product 2 belongs to a different category from Product 1. As a result, households may not assign 
perceived implicit ranks to Products 1 and 2. Because 02,1,  PP RR and 0
ˆˆ
21 TT , Firm 2 may 
be able to escape from a high  21
~~
TTp  and the monopoly power of Firm 1. Firm 2’s category 
differentiation strategy may, of course, not always succeed, for a variety of reasons. For example, 
the demand for the newly perceived category to which Product 2 is thought to belong may be far 
smaller than that for the category Product 1 is thought to belong to, or adding different secondary 
practical uses to Product 2 may make
2Tˆ smaller than it was originally and  21
~~
TTp   may 
increase.      
 In addition to successfully implementing a category differentiation strategy, Firm 2 can 
simultaneously try to improve the quality of its product for the main practical use. By doing so, 
Firm 2 may be able to change the position from
21
ˆˆ TT  to 21
ˆˆ TT  in the original category. If the 
implicit ranking in the original category is reset to the initial state (i.e., RP,1 = RP,2 = 0) by Firm 
2’s category differentiation strategy, a change in position from
21
ˆˆ TT  to 21
ˆˆ TT  will make 
households reverse the previous implicit ranking to 21, PR and 12, PR and Product 2 can take a 
larger share of sales than Product 1. However, Firm 1 will not sit idly by as Firm 2 pursues this 
strategy; it will soon counterattack Firm 2 by using the same strategy. If Firm 1 succeeds, Firm 2 
will counterattack Firm 1, and these reciprocal attacks and counterattacks may be repeated for a 
long period. These “battles” between firms may be described as wave-like dynamic processes.  
 The effectiveness of a category differentiation strategy will depend on how households 
judge the categories of the two products. In general, classification has a hierarchical structure. 
Higher layers in the hierarchy include broader and more general subjects and lower layers include 
narrower and more specific subjects. In the higher layers, the two products may belong to the 
same category, but not on the lower layers. Hence, household recognition of product category 
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similarities varies depending on the layer on which the household judges. Conversely, a key issue 
for the success of a category differentiation strategy is to correctly anticipate the layer on which 
the households judge the product category.   
 
4.3  Firm rank  
In the previous sections, firm rank was ignored, but households give implicit ranks not only to 
products but also to firms, and the firm rank also influences
vT
~
. The implicit rank of a firm will 
be formed on the basis of its reputation, fame, size, history, international activities, social 
activities, environmental consciousness, and many other factors. Similar to product categories, if 
firms belong to different industries, no implicit rank is assigned. It is likely that, as the rank of a 
firm increases, the
vT
~
of a product that the firm produces also increases. Therefore, higher ranking 
firms have advantages over lower ranking firms when they introduce new products into markets. 
It is likely that the implicit ranks of larger and more famous firms will be relatively high, and 
conversely, smaller and less well-known firms may generally have disadvantages from the 
beginning. 
 Note that ranking bias may also exist for firms (see Section 3.1.5). Households may 
perceive that the quality of products produced by a relatively large and more famous firm is 
basically better than that produced by a relatively small and less famous firm. In other words, 
households may judge that the risks associated with products produced by a relatively large and 
more famous firm are lower. The risks associated with products produced by unknown firms may 
be truly higher, but the true difference may be far smaller than generally thought. If the difference 
is exaggerated, this is an example of biased perception. Nevertheless, as was the case with the 
implicit ranking of products, it seems unlikely that rational households will persistently 
incorrectly evaluate these risks. In particular, for products that are repeatedly purchased by a 
household, the effect of firm ranking bias is most likely quite small, or even negligible if it truly 
exists. 
 
4.4  Advertising 
An important function of advertising is to disseminate information about the products a firm wants 
to sell. The model of product differentiation presented in this paper indicates that advertising has 
another important function—to induce households to perceive that a product’s implicit rank is 
high. Because implicit rankings are formed through various sources of information, there is room 
for a firm to manipulate the implicit rank of its product. An important element that influences 
implicit rankings is fame, and fame can be manipulated by advertising to some extent. If 
households are exposed to a large number of television commercials about a specific product, 
they may begin to perceive that the product’s implicit rank is high, regardless of the product’s 
actual rank. Once the product is successfully perceived as the higher ranked product, its Tv 
increases even if its
vTˆ is lower than its rival’s.  
 
4.5  Creating a breakthrough innovation 
As shown in Section 3.4, the monopoly power of Firm 1 is persistent and not easy to change. One 
possible way for Firm 2 to reverse the relationship is to create a breakthrough innovation. If the 
effect of a breakthrough innovation can overwhelm the effect of the current implicit ranking, then 
Firm 2 can change the position not only from
21
ˆˆ TT  to 21
ˆˆ TT  but also from 21 TT  to 21 TT  . 
Of course, creating a breakthrough innovation is not usually an easy task.   
 
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Product differentiation has been studied in both economics and business administration, but the 
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arguments in the two fields seem to be contradictory. In economics, the strategy of product 
differentiation does not necessarily lead to large differences in firms’ profits (e.g., Hotelling, 
1929), whereas in business administration, it is one of Porter’s (1980, 1985) three core strategies.  
 In this paper, product differentiation is examined by considering ranking preference and 
value—an element that is not considered by Hotelling or Porter. Households choose and purchase 
a product from among rival products because its implicit rank in society is higher, even if the 
other factors like quality and taste are almost the same. A slight difference in quality results in 
clear differences in implicit ranks of products and therefore in large differences in firms’ profits. 
The effect of differentiation is amplified by households’ ranking preferences, so firms’ efforts for 
product differentiation are very important. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A1  Ranking value and preference 
A1.1  Ranking  
Ranking indicates an ordered list of relative standing. Indeed, the concept of relativity is essential 
in ranking. Even if the absolute abilities and performances of competitors are almost identical, 
only one person or group can be the best or the champion. Even if there is little difference in an 
absolute sense, there are significant differences in a relative sense because people will derive 
utility through various types of rankings in different aspects of life. On some occasions, people 
practically neglect the absolute performances and are interested only in the rankings. Therefore, 
both absolute and relative differences surely have an important influence on people’s thoughts 
and activities. 
 In general, absolute terms are used in economic studies. Even though ordinal utility is 
conceptually important, cardinal utility is assumed in most studies. Therefore, the concept of 
ranking or relativity has not typically been seen as an important element in economics. However, 
because people are interested in rankings and relative differences, these factors will affect many 
aspects of economic activity.  
 
A1.2  Ranking value and preference 
A1.2.1  Practical value and ranking value 
Value is regarded as reflecting something useful. In this paper, it is assumed that there are two 
kinds of value: practical value and ranking value. Practical value is the value that people feel 
when consuming a good or service for practical purposes. Ranking value is the value that people 
feel from the rank of a good or service in a set of similar types of goods or services that people 
use, possess, or observe. Ranking value, therefore, is the value people place on goods or services 
on the basis of their rank (e.g., the ranking of a book in a best-seller list or that of a professional 
baseball team in a league). For example, people will buy a book not only because of its practical 
usefulness but also because of its popularity. That is, a book can have value not only on the basis 
of its practical usefulness (its practical value) but also on the basis of its popularity (its ranking 
value).  
 In many cases, practical value may be almost identical to the usual sense of value. If a 
good or service is more practically useful than another good or service, it has a higher practical 
value. People obtain utility from practical value through the consumption of goods and services. 
On the other hand, ranking value does not require practical usefulness. Even if a good or service 
is not practically useful, it can still have ranking value if it possesses a ranking: an example is the 
price of a curio that is not practically useful but is evaluated to be the best among a set of similar 
types of curios. If the rank of a good or service is higher than those of others in the set, its ranking 
value is higher. People obtain utility from ranking value through the consumption (use, possession, 
or observation) of goods and services. 
 For example, many people like to watch professional sports, even though watching them 
may be of little practical value. A sense of enthusiasm and fun is generated when viewing 
professional sports, but such emotions may not reflect any practical usefulness. Although the 
emotions generated may not be practically useful, the desire to watch, witness, and immediately 
know the winner (i.e., the best or the champion) provides ranking value. Although some people 
may want to see a game because they enjoy watching the performance (similar to watching a 
circus act), most people watch professional sports to watch, witness, and immediately know who 
wins: that is, they want to feel the sense of ranking and consume ranking value. People thereby 
obtain utility from the sense of ranking. I call people’s preference for ranking value a “ranking 
preference.” A mathematical expression of ranking preference is presented in Section A2.  
 
A1.2.2  The origin of ranking value and preference 
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If ranking preference is a deep parameter of human behavior, it will be deeply rooted in the 
process of evolution of human beings; that is, it will be closely related to survival in the long 
history of humans. I propose the following two fundamental desires as the roots of ranking 
preference.   
 
(1) Desire to win a struggle, conflict, or war 
Struggles and conflicts are fundamental elements in life. In social species, they occur not only 
between individuals but also between rival groups. Struggles and conflicts generate intense 
emotions, including a strong desire to win. In an evolutionary sense, winning or losing a struggle 
or conflict was often a matter of life and death. Hence, people are very excited by struggles and 
conflicts. Interestingly, people may be excited by the occurrence of struggle or conflict itself, 
regardless of the eventual outcome. People therefore may “demand” the excitement of struggle, 
conflict, and even war (James, 1910; Cannon, 1915). If a particular group wins, the people in that 
group will be happy and comfortable (i.e., obtain utility). It is likely that humans have evolved to 
be excited by the occurrence of struggle or conflict because this response is important for their 
survival. Therefore, people have evolved to obtain utility from the occurrence of struggle or 
conflict regardless of whether they are actually involved in the conflict itself.  
 An important nature of struggle and conflict is that, regardless of the quality of 
performances in the struggle or conflict, a win is a win. Absolute performances in struggles or 
conflicts are basically meaningless, whereas relative performances are vitally important. For 
example, in a horse race, the winning time is basically meaningless, but the order of finish is 
valuable. If they are relatively superior, people can win even if the difference in the performances 
is very slight. That is, people are happy not only because they are strong but also because they are 
stronger, and they are happy when they are the strongest. As a result, rankings generate strong 
emotions in people’s minds. These emotions are among the origins of ranking value and 
preference.  
 
(2) Desire to behave in accordance with dominance hierarchy 
Many species—particularly social species—have dominance hierarchies (see, e.g., Landau, 1951; 
Bayly et al., 2006). Most primates, including humans, have hierarchical societies. Dominance 
hierarchy has evolved to be deeply integrated into primate societal behaviors by necessity. Under 
dominance hierarchy, an individual’s rank in its group is crucial. Knowing one’s own rank and 
the rank of others is a significantly important part of living in a societal group.  
 Because life strategies in a societal group vary depending on an individual’s rank, 
individuals must constantly reconfirm their rank. If individuals are unable to confirm their ranks, 
they may face adverse outcomes or even death. This confirmatory need may be accompanied by 
subordinate behaviors such as admiring, supporting, and following the leader and punishing 
members who neglect the ranking.  
 Therefore, it is likely that humans have evolved to possess the emotion or urge to 
regularly reconfirm rankings. In other words, people have evolved to obtain utility from regularly 
reconfirming ranking orders within groups. Conversely, people will be very uneasy and 
uncomfortable if they are unable to correctly assess the latest rankings. Only after they reconfirm 
rankings will they feel at ease and comfortable and be satisfied. It is likely that this intrinsic 
emotion is another origin of ranking value and preference. 
 
A1.2.3  Importance of ranking 
The emotions that underlie ranking value and preference will clearly surface on various occasions. 
Sports have been often seen as a substitute for war (Santayana, 1972: Fischer, 2002). Watching 
professional sports satisfies people’s desires and makes them feel comfortable because the games 
substitute for struggle, conflict, and war. Fans of a specific team may view the team as a substitute 
for the mother country or tribe in a war. People often form attachments to a specific sports team 
and maintain allegiance to it as if it gives them a sense of tribal unity. Another example of this 
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emotion is in people’s responses to titles in the business world. A title indicates the rank of a 
person in a company, organization, or group. Whatever the true quality of performance of any 
given person, people evaluate and judge that person on the basis of the title to some extent. The 
quality of performance is of course important, but the title (rank) is also important. 
 Ranking is therefore an important element in people’s lives and economic activities. For 
some goods or service, people may even place higher values on rank than on practical use. It is 
highly likely that humans are intrinsically equipped with emotions that respond to various types 
of ranking. Therefore, if people do not sufficiently consider rankings in their daily activities, they 
may not be successful in managing their lives.  
 
A2  A model of superstardom 
A2.1  Background 
As noted in the Introduction, Rosen (1981) performed early and important work on the model of 
superstardom. He attributed the extremely high incomes of superstars to a special market structure 
(i.e., “non-rivalry”). However, Adler (2006) criticized Rosen (1981) by arguing that non-rivalry 
results in very low prices, thus suggesting that superstars would actually be poor. Adler (1985) 
presented a different model and argued that the extremely high incomes of superstars can be 
attributed to what he called consumption capital. However, the assumption of increasing marginal 
utility in his model is not easily acceptable. Borghans and Groot (1998) presented a model based 
on the argument of Frank and Cook (1995). They argued that the extremely high incomes of 
superstars are attributable to “endogenous property rights” and the monopoly power that these 
rights generate, because people have a strong tendency to want to watch the performance of 
someone known to be the best. Frank and Cook (1995) argued that, in modern economies, the 
winner takes all of the money in many industries. However, the argument of Frank and Cook 
(1995) is strictly narrative and lacks a theoretical model that clearly explains why the winner takes 
all. The model of Borghans and Groot (1998) suffers from the same drawback, because the 
mechanism used to explain people’s strong tendency to want to watch the winner, the best, or the 
champion is not sufficiently developed and is at best only suggested.  
 The concept of ranking value and preference discussed in Section A1 is, however, 
closely related to the arguments of Frank and Cook (1995) and Borghans and Groot (1998), 
because they commonly emphasize that household consumption is influenced by both absolute 
and relative performances or qualities.  
 
A2.2  The model of superstardom 
A2.2.1  The model  
Goods and services have three properties: quantity, quality, and ranking. Quality is related to 
practical value, and ranking is related to ranking value. Quantity is related to both values. Suppose 
that the quality and ranking of each good or service are given exogenously and fixed. Here, for 
simplicity, I assume that there is only one type of good or service in the economy, and that all 
goods or services belong to this type (these goods or services are hereafter called “goods”) and 
are substitutable for each other for households’ practical uses. Although the goods are 
substitutable from the point of view of practical uses, they are differentiated from the point of 
view of ranking. 
 Let R (= 1, 2, 3, …) be the rank of the goods. Goods with rank R = 1 are those most 
preferred by households. R = 2 indicates the next most preferred, and so on. It is assumed for 
simplicity that there is no tied rank. A household’s utility derived from consuming the goods with 
rank R is  
 
 Rqqu RlRn ,, ,,  
 
where qn,R and ql,R are the quantity and quality of the goods with rank R, respectively. For 
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simplicity, the utility of the household is modified to  
 
 Rqu R ,
~  
 
where
Rq
~ is the “quality-adjusted quantity” of the goods with rank R, and
l,Rn,RR qqq 
~ . The use 
of quality-adjusted quantity is based on the assumption that, given a standard (reference) quality 
of the goods, consuming α% worse/better quality goods than the standard quality goods for 
practical use is equivalent to consuming α% more/less of these goods than the standard quality 
goods for practical use. The quality-adjusted quantity
Rq
~ therefore indicates the “real” quantity 
of the goods standardized by a reference quality. 
 The utility function has the following conventional characteristics: 
 
 
0~
~



R
R
q
,Rqu
 
 
and 
 
  
 
0~
~
2
2



R
R
q
,Rqu
 . 
 
In addition, for ranking preference, the following characteristics are assumed. For any Rr ,  
 
   ,rqu,rqu rr
~1~                            (A1) 
 
and 
 
       ,rqu,rqu,rqu,rqu rrrr
~1~1~2~   .              (A2) 
 
Inequality (A1) indicates that, as rank becomes lower (R increases), utility decreases, and 
inequality (A2) indicates that, as rank becomes lower (R increases), the magnitude of decrease in 
utility with a lowering in rank decreases.  
 It is assumed, furthermore, for simplicity that utilities are separable. Therefore, a 
household’s total utility derived from its consumption of goods of various ranks is described as  
 
   



1
~~
R
RRankQuant ,RququU                       (A3) 
 
where uQuant (∙) and uRank (∙) are the utility function for consumption of practical value and that of 
ranking value, respectively, and 
 
  



1
~~
R
Rqq  . 
 
Similarly, the following conventional characteristics of the utility function are assumed: 
 
 
0


q~
q~uQuant  
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 
0
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

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q~
q~uQuant  
 
 
0~
~



R
RRank
q
,Rqu
 
 
and 
 
  
 
0~
~
2
2



R
RRank
q
,Rqu
 . 
 
In addition, with respect to ranking preference, the following characteristics are assumed. For any
Rr ,  
 
   ,rqu,rqu rRankrRank
~1~                         (A4) 
 
and 
 
       ,rqu,rqu,rqu,rqu rRankrRankrRankrRank
~1~1~2~   .        (A5) 
 
 The budget constraint of households is  
 








111
~~~~
R
RRRank,Quant
R
RRRank,
R
RQuant qpqpqpqpI            (A6) 
 
where I is the budget (income) of the household and is exogenously given and constant,
Quantp is 
the price of a unit of
Rq
~ consumed for practical value, and pRank,R is the price of a unit of Rq
~
consumed for ranking value. The price for practical value is identical for any R, qn,R, and ql,R. 
Equation (A6) indicates that there is not only a price for ranking value but also a price for practical 
value, and households pay for both practical values and ranking values when they buy the goods. 
A household maximizes its utility (equation [A3]) subject to the budget constraint (equation [A6]). 
 On the other hand, the producer of the goods with rank R behaves to maximize its profits. 
For simplicity, costs to produce the goods are assumed to be directly proportional to
Rq
~ and 
identical for any R, qn,R, and ql,R. Let c be the cost per one unit of Rq
~ . Therefore, the profit of the 
producer of the goods with rank R (ΠR) is 
 
RRRRRank,RQuantR cq
~cq~pq~pΠ                     (A7) 
 
where
Rc is the fixed cost of the producer of goods with rank R. 
 
A2.2.2  The model with continuous ranking 
Ranks are discrete by nature. However, for simplicity, it is assumed that rank is continuous. Let 
R be [0,1) . The utility of a household is therefore changed to  
 
   
1
0
~~ dR,RququU RRankQuant                      (A8) 
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where 
1
0
~~ dRqq R . The budget constraint of a household is changed to  
 
dRqpqpI RRRank,Quant 
1
0
~~  
 
Inequalities (A1), (A2), (A4), and (A5) are changed respectively to  
 
 
0
~



R
,Rqu R  ,                           (A9) 
 
  
 
0
~
2
2



R
,Rqu R  , 
 
 
0
~



R
,Rqu RRank  ,                        (A10) 
 
and 
 
  
 
0
~
2
2



R
,Rqu RRank  . 
 
A2.3  The mechanism of superstardom 
A2.3.1  Extremely high incomes of superstars 
A2.3.1.1  Monopoly power 
Ranking value and preference provide monopoly powers to the producers of the goods because 
selling ranking value to consumers requires no additional cost, i.e., the marginal cost of producing 
a ranking value is zero, and thereby producers can set PRank,R above the marginal cost. Thanks to 
their monopoly powers, producers are not price-takers. Rather, they can strategically set their 
prices for rank pRank,R in equation (A7) so as to maximize their profits Πr. Rq
~ and pRank,R are 
therefore determined by producers’ strategic behaviors.  
 
A2.3.1.2  The shape of the utility function 
The shape of the utility function with regard to ranking (
Ranku ) is important in determining the 
magnitude of the producers’ monopoly power. Depending on the values of
 
R
,Rqu RRank

 ~
in 
inequality (A10), utility functions can take various shapes, and the strength of monopoly power 
depends on inequality (A10) (or inequality [A4]). As ranking preference becomes stronger—that 
is, as the values of
 
R
,Rqu RRank

 ~
become larger for any R—a household is willing to buy the 
goods for a higher price pRank,R than it did before. This means that, if a household’s ranking 
preference becomes stronger, the monopoly powers of the producers become stronger, and the 
producers of the higher-ranked goods can set even higher prices.  
 Inequalities (A9) and (A10) (or inequalities [A1] and [A4]) indicate that iRank,p  
jRank,p if i < j where Rji , . The producer of the goods with rank 1 therefore has the strongest 
monopoly power, and it can set the highest price (pRank,1) relative to the other producers. If the 
ranking preference is extremely strong, the producer of the goods with rank 1 will monopolize 
almost all revenues in the industry. 
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A2.3.1.3  The strategy for non-rival goods and services 
Even if ranking preference is very strong, however, producers of the goods may not necessarily 
set high prices for ranking value (pRank,R). Instead of setting pRank,R high, they may plan to sell 
larger quantities by keeping pRank,R relatively low if monopoly profits are maximized by doing so. 
Whether this strategy is adopted will depend on the degree of rivalry of the goods with respect to 
practical value. In the case of rival goods or services with respect to practical use, this low price 
strategy will not be adopted. However, in the case of non-rival goods or services (i.e., if very little 
cost is needed to produce and distribute additional units for practical use), then the strategy of 
setting relatively low prices for ranking value may be preferred.  
 In the case of non-rival goods or services, the marginal cost to produce not only ranking 
value but also practical value is almost zero. In this case, even if the price for the practical value 
is set relatively low, it is still above the marginal cost. That is, the supply curve of such goods (the 
marginal cost for practical value plus that for ranking value) will be situated at a very low price 
level and will be almost flat. On the other hand, lower prices will attract more consumers. If the 
demand curve is also almost flat in a low price range, the profits of the producer of the non-rival 
goods may be far larger when the strategy of setting a relatively low price for ranking value and 
thereby attracting a larger number of consumers is taken. That is, the maximum monopoly profits 
may be realized when the price is set relatively low. This low price strategy is closely related to 
the argument presented by Rosen (1981).  
 
A2.3.2  The two-producer model 
A2.3.2.1  The model 
A two-producer version of the model is used in this section for simplicity to demonstrate the 
mechanism of superstardom. Suppose that there are only two producers: producers of goods with 
rank 1 and rank 2. Let them be producer 1 and producer 2, respectively. In addition, for simplicity, 
pQuant and uQuant are ignored. Hence, a household maximizes its utility 
 
   2~1~ 21 ,qu,quU RankRank   
 
subject to its budget constraint   
 
2211
~~ qpqpI Rank,Rank,   
 
where I, pRank,1, and pRank,2 are exogenously given. It is assumed that the ranking preference of the 
household is very strong—that is,    2~1~ 11 ,qu,qu RankRank  is very large. Hence, the indifference 
curve is almost horizontal (Figs. A1 and A2).  
 Producers 1 and 2 set their prices to maximize their profits, such that 
 
rrrRank,r qcqpΠ
~~   
 
for r = 1, 2.  
 
A2.3.2.2  Equilibrium prices and quantities 
In the model with only two producers there is a duopoly. Suppose that producer 2 sets its price 
for ranking value pRank,2, and then, considering pRank,2, producer 1 sets its price for ranking value 
pRank,1 to maximize its profits. The quantities 1
~q and 2
~q are determined at the point of contact 
between an indifference curve and the household budget constraint (Fig. A1).  
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Figure A1: The case of a given PRank,2   
   
 
 
As pRank,1 is set higher, 2
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. An important point is that, because of very strong ranking 
preference and almost horizontal indifference curves, there is a range of pRank,1 where 21
~~ qq 
even if pRank,1 > pRank,2 (Fig. A1). That is, producer 1 can obtain far larger profits than producer 2.  
 However, because of the duopoly, game theoretic considerations apply. Producer 2 will 
change its price pRank,2 after recognizing producer 1’s price pRank,1 (Fig. A2). Each producer will 
adjust its prices for ranking value strategically by considering the other’s behavior. Most simply, 
pRank,1, pRank,2, 1
~q , and 2
~q will be determined at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Each producer has 
its own response function, which indicates the producer’s set of best strategies when a strategy of 
the other producer is given (i.e. its best prices for ranking value when the other’s price for ranking 
value is given). Response functions are depicted as response curves on the pRank,1 versus pRank,2 
plane in Figure A3. Equilibrium occurs at the point of intersection of the response curves. Note 
that neither producer sets its prices for ranking value below c because it would suffer losses by 
doing so (Fig. A3).  
Indifference curves 
for lower 
 PRank,1 
Budget constraint 
for higher PRank,1 
for higher 
PRank,1 
0 
 
Budget constraint 
for lower PRank,1 
for higher P
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for lower P
Rank, 1
 
1
~q  
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Figure A2: The case of a given PRank,1 
   
 
 
 The shapes of the response curves of producers 1 and 2 are very different because of the 
households’ very strong ranking preference—that is, because the indifference curve is almost 
horizontal. Because producer 1 can set significantly higher prices than producer 2, thanks to the 
very strong ranking preference, the response curve of producer 1 is situated at the upper side of 
the plane in Figure A3, whereas the response curve of producer 2 is situated at the left side of the 
plane. As a result, pRank,1 is notably higher than pRank,2 at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. As the 
ranking preference increases, the response curve of producer 1 moves higher and that of producer 
2 moves farther left, and the difference between pRank,1 and pRank,2 at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
also increases. 
 Figure A3 indicates that, if ranking preference is strong, the equilibrium quantity of 
goods with rank 1 will not decrease largely even if producer 2 sets its price at pRank,2 = c (i.e.,
02 Π ). This means that, if households’ ranking preference is strong enough, producer 2 must 
accept far smaller profits than producer 1 no matter which strategy producer 2 chooses. In other 
words, producer 1 can be a superstar. This is the mechanism of superstardom. 
 Note that producer 1 may set its price for ranking value (pRank,1) very low to expel 
producer 2 out of the market and completely monopolize the profits. However, if producer 2 is 
expelled and only producer 1 remains in the market, the ranking becomes meaningless for 
households and thereby the ranking value of the goods with rank 1 will be zero. Therefore, 
producer 1 will set its price for ranking value (pRank,1) sufficiently high so that producer 2 will not 
leave the market.  
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Figure A3: Cournot-Nash equilibrium under strong ranking 
preference  
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